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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO STATE DEPARTMENT
SUGGESTIONS: RECOGNITION OF
PREROGATIVE OR ABDICATION
TO USURPER?
Michael H. Cardozot
In no cases do the courts of this country defer to executive suggestions
as often and as fully as in those having international ramifications. While
occasionally accepted as a wise "accommodation by abdication," 1 this
deference periodically provokes charges that the courts are abdicating
their responsibilities and that the Department of State is usurping the
judiciary's role. These are serious charges in our domestic affairs, but
internationally the consequences of a rejection of executive suggestions
in such cases can be grave in a world where friendly relations often rest
on very thin ice. The deference, the charges and the risks were the subject of the Third Summer Conference on International Law at Cornell
in 1960. Among the learned conferees at that meeting was a member of
the judiciary, experienced in law and in the conduct of international relations. "Certainly as a judge I have been educated,"12 was his summation
of the discussions, and he was speaking aptly for many others. This
article is in large part a result of that educational experience.
It is tempting to believe that the same experience had some influence
on the revision of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States; certainly the portion dealing with the Act of State Doctrine that appears in the "Proposed Official Draft" of May, 1962, bears
only remote resemblance to the version thaf was defended and attacked
at the 1960 Summer Conference.' In any event, the Restatement's treatment of the subject of executive influence on court decisions, and the
later commentaries, especially those based on the recent Cuban cases,
show the continued uncertainty in the state of the law in this area. The
range of situations in which the United States Department of State,
usually through its Legal Adviser, addresses itself to domestic courts
has been the subject of recent studies, and has been described with clarity
and thoroughness in a recent article by a member of its own staff, Richard
t MICAEL H. C~mwozo, Professor of Law, Cornell University, A.B. 1932, Dartmouth
College; LL.B. 1935, Yale Law School. U.S. Department of Justice, 1940-42; Office of the
Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1945-52; Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern
University, 1961-62.
1 Franck, "The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for
Judicial Abdication," 44 Minn. L. Rev. 1101, 1103 (1960).
2 Charles Fahy, in International Law in National Courts 179 (Third Cornell Summer
Conference on Intl Law 1960).
3 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960).
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Bilder.4 He delineates the problems, but, duly exercising the discretion
that a government official, especially one in diplomatic activities, is so
often advised to observe, he has insulated his own views with an ample
coating of conditional verbs.
Untrammeled by official position I will propose in this article that the
executive branch has a duty to make its voice heard in many international
cases before the courts and that the judges usually must, without question, give heed to what is said. This doctrine applies to any case where
it is important to the national interest that the United States government
be heard to speak "with only one voice," and also where a particular
rule of law depends for its vigor on action by the executive branch.
Naturally such a doctrine must be sedulously circumscribed to maintain
the proper relation between executive and judiciary in a government of
separate powers. It will be the purpose of this article to propose methods
of distinguishing between the circumstances where application of the
doctrine is appropriate and where it has no place. I feel that it will be a
service to the judicial function if devotion to that function can be reconciled with the extent of judicial deference that has always been and
in my view, really must be shown to political determinations in cases
arising in the field of foreign affairs.
The problem of judicial deference to the executive must be characterized as an issue of separation of powers, a sacred principle in the
American system of government. Perhaps our treatment of the principle
is unique, but every schoolboy learns that under the United States governmental system each of the three branches has an area of exclusive
competence. One branch encroaches on another only at the risk of censure
by partisans and patriots and restraint by the courts. Conversely, if one
branch abdicates one of its functions, scholars and politicians will join
in condemnation. To appreciate this, one need only read the editorial
and scholarly comments on Baker v. Carr,5 where the Supreme Court
held that the method of legislative apportionment may be, after all, a
justiciable rather than a "political" matter. The Court was promptly
charged with breaching the wall of separation between judiciary and
politics. Both majority and minority opinions in that case contain sections discussing the point at which "foreign relations" aspects of a
controversy become political questions beyond the reach of judicial
concern. Thus we are warned that the scope of the principle of separa4 Bilder, "The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign
Affairs," 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 633, 667-78 (1962). See also Franck, supra note 1; Moore, "The
Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings," 31 Fordham L. Rev. 277 (1962).
5 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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tion of powers is authoritatively recognized as involved in the problem
under review. On such ground only the temerariousO would fail to tread
most gingerly.
Some commentators have expressed concern lest the deference so
often paid by courts to pronouncements by the executive branch cause
injustice to private litigants who are not given a chance by the executive
branch to be heard at the most crucial phase of their cases. Admittedly,
unless the affected parties are given a hearing before an executive pronouncement is sent to the judge, they will never have a day in court on
what may prove to be the key issue in the case.7 Some kind of a hearing
consistent wi*th
ieprinciples of due process is essential whenever the
expression/t executive views will affect the decision of a court. And this
occursi a very wide range of subjects related to international affairs.
Most of them are listed, with relevant cases cited, in the Reporter's Note
to section 155 of the Proposed Official Draft of the Restatement.8 They
include recognition of nations and governments; sovereign and diplomatic immunity; acts of state, such as nationalization; the existence of
a state of war or neutrality; the status and interpretation of treaties; the
issuance of passports; immigration, nationality, and entry for business
purposes. 9 The courts' decisions in cases of these kinds show us that the
judges almost always decide consistently with State Department "suggestions," interpretations, findings, certifications and so forth. Whether
the courts treat these interventions as conclusive or only of "great
weight," a litigant has a just complaint if they occur before he has had
a chance to argue for the kind of intervention he thinks proper in his
case. When he is arguing about the policy, the facts or the law, he deserves a day in court. As the State Department's responsibilities expand
more and more into the daily affairs of the citizen, it must accept more
of the duties of any agency involved in the administrative process. This
duty was recognized early in the trade agreements program, when timely
hearings on proposed tariff changes were instituted. ° Hearings on denials
6 The word is from Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 210, 227 (1960). On the
separation of powers generally, see Nathanson, "The Supreme Court as a Unit of the National Government: Herein of Separation of Powers and Political Questions," 6 J. Pub. L.
331 (1957); Parker, "Judiciary and Executive Branch of Government," 9 The jurist 205
(1949).
7 M. H. Cardozo, "Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court," 67
Harv. L. Rev. 608 (1954) ; see text accompanying note 66 infra. Cf. Note, 50 Calif. L. Rev.
559 (1962).
8 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 155, at 561-62 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
9 The practice is reviewed generally in Lyons, "The Conclusiveness of the 'Suggestion'
and Certificate of the American State Department," 24 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 116 (1947); I
Oppenheim, International Law 765-68 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); Notes, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev.
79 (1948) ; 50 Geo. L.J. 284 (1961).
10 See Trade Agreements Act § 4, 48 Stat. 945 (1934), 19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1958).
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of passports have more recently been provided. 1 To have to make provision for still more opportunities to-be heard should not unduly burden
the process of administering foreign relations. Indeed the officers of the
Department should welcome an orderly procedure in place of the harassment of having to receive at irregular times the more knowledgeable
lawyers who already know how vital it is to be heard when the policy
decision is being formulated.
There are those who eloquently plead that the whole process of deciding on the immunity or not of a defendant is "essentially judicial,"
which the State Department cannot properly perform because it "does
not have the facilities necessary to decide the often complex issues involved."' 2 The Department, however, in its claims functions has, throughout its history, had to decide just such issues of ownership and classification as, for example, are involved in sovereign immunity cases. Before
espousing a claim against another country, the Department must be
satisfied as to the private claimant's citizenship, ownership, and injury.'3 This has required the decision of issues of fact and law. If the
assistant legal adviser in charge of suggestions and certifications to courts
is worried about the procedures of hearing counsel for private parties
presenting their arguments and the responsibility of deciding difficult
questions, let him get some advice and instructions from the assistant
legal adviser in charge of claims.
THE CASE OF THE BAHIA DE NIPE

To clarify the problem of executive intervention, let us consider the
facts and issues of a recent case that arose out of the actions of the
Castro government in Cuba, Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. 4 On August 8,
1961, the S.S. Bahia de Nipe sailed from Cuba with a cargo of sugar
destined for a port in the Soviet Union. This ship had been owned by a
private Cuban firm, Naviera Vacuba, S.A., but had been seized by the
Cuban government as part of its program of nationalization. About five
years earlier, it had been the subject of news reports in this country
when a group of Cubans in New York had tried in vain to obtain asylum
for a prisoner in its brig who was being taken back to Cuba to be tried
11 Dep't of State Reg. 108.475, 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-70 (Supp. 1963).
12 Timberg, "Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception," in
Essays on International jurisdiction 58 (Ohio State 1961). See also Jessup, The Use of
International Law 83-84 (1959).
13 Bishop, International Law: Cases and Materials 738-43 (2d ed. 1962); I Witeman,
Damages in International Law 130 (1937); Christenson, "International Claims Procedure
Before The Department of State," 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 527 (1962).

14 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), go Calif. L. Rev. 559 (1962).
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for revolutionary activities against the Batista regime. 15 It is an interesting twist of history that on August 17th, 1961, while enroute to the
Soviet Union, on the high seas, the master and ten of the crew turned the
Bahia de Nipe toward the United States and advised the Coast Guard
that they intended to enter the United States and seek asylum from
Batista's successor. The remainder of the crew were being held in restraint. In due time the ship entered a harbor in Virginia under the
escort of the United States Coast Guard. Almost immediately libels
against the vessel and cargo were filed on behalf of three claimants:
(1) two longshoremen who held unsatisfied judgments of United States
courts against the Republic of Cuba and Naviera Vacuba, the former
owner; (2) a judgment creditor holding a judgment for $500,000 against
the Republic of Cuba rendered in a Louisiana state court; and (3) the
United Fruit Sugar Company, which before nationalization had been
the owner of the sugar now aboard the Bahia de Nipe. There were other
claims that need not be considered for the purposes of this discussion.
At the threshold of the proceedings there arose a controversy over the
service on the ship of the court's processes by the United States marshal.
The Coast Guard prevented the marshal from boarding and performing
his duties, claiming authority under a statute giving the President power
during emergencies to control the movement of foreign flag vessels. The
district court 16 and the court of appeals both held that this act did not
authorize the Coast Guard, under the present circumstances, to prevent
the marshal from serving his papers. In view of the further holding of
the courts on the sovereign immunity issue, however, the question of
service became irrelevant. It would have been interesting, nonetheless, to
see how the courts would have dealt with a claim that a vessel taken into
territorial waters as a result of an act of barratry should be treated as
17
immune from service to the same extent as a vessel entering in distress.
Acting through the medium of Swiss diplomatic channels, because of
the absence of United States and Cuban diplomatic missions in Havana
and Washington, respectively, the Cuban government on August 21,
1961, notified the United States Government that the Bahia de Nipe
was the property of the government of Cuba, and requested that it be
granted immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts in the United
N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1957, p. 8.
16 Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S. A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961).
17 See Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 191 (1927);
United States in Behalf of Kate A. Hoff v. United Mexican States, General Claims Conm'n
Ops. 174 (1929) p. 509. Barratry was mentioned in the government's memorandum to the
Supreme Court as supporting the suggestion of immunity made by the State Department in
the Rich case, supra note 16.
15
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States. This assertion and request were, in accordance with well known
practice,"8 duly forwarded by the Department of State on August 21st
to the Attorney General, in a letter which also stated,
This is- to inform you that the Department of State recognizes and
allows the claim of the Government of Cuba for immunity of said vessel
and its cargo from the jurisdiction of United States Courts. Accordingly,
you are requested to instruct the appropriate United States Attorney to
file with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia a suggestion of immunity in this case. 19
The Secretary of State had, in the two previous days, sent letters to
the Attorney General stating that "the release of this vessel [Bahia de
Nipe] would avoid further disturbance to our international relations in
the premises" and "that the prompt release of the vessel is necessary to
secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United
States.120 These were somewhat cryptic statements, differing as they do

from the standard terminology of sovereign immunity correspondence.
They provoked from the court of appeals the remark that they were
"infelicitously expressed," but nonetheless "sufficiently set forth the
requisites of a valid suggestion for the allowance of sovereign immunity"" within the doctrine of Ex Parte Republic of Peru2
If the judges in the case had been reading the daily newspapers at
the time of the arrival in the United States of the Bahia de Nipe, they
would have recognized the circumstances that made "prompt release
of the ship" so "necessary to secure the observance of the rights and
obligations of the United States." We must probably aver that judges
should be no more influenced directly by such circumstances than by
the election returns. It is clear, however, that the Department of State
was, and properly so, influenced by the fact that, two days before the
Bahia de Nipe arrived in Virginia waters, the Cuban government had
released an Eastern Air Lines Electra plane that had been hijacked and
flown to Cuba in July. Simultaneously the United States had released
from its custody a Cuban naval vessel taken to Florida by anti-Castro
Cubans. In one of its diplomatic notes on the subject, the Cuban government had said that "if the Government of the United States guarantees
the right of immunity and sovereignty of the boats and airplanes belonging to the Cuban people that are seized in our country and taken to
United States territory, as proclaimed in the note submitted by the
18 Lyons, supra note 9; M. H. Cardozo, supra note 7.
19 Letter from the files of the Department of State.
20 Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., supra note 16, at 714, 715.
21 Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 25 (4th Cir. 1961).
22 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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Government of the United States to the Security Council... the Government of Cuba will accord reciprocal treatment to American boats and
airplanes that are in a similar situation.""5 This, then, was part of the
political background against which the suggestion of immunity was made
in the United States district court in Norfolk, Virginia, on August 21,
1961.
Certainly the Department of State had political motives when it forwarded the suggestion. In the light of a history of such suggestions
running from the case of the Schooner Exchange24 through Transandine,6
Bernstein,6 Peru2 7 and others right up to the present day, it is very late
to say that the executive should not intervene in this way. The Legal
Adviser of the State Department surely could not have been stating a
contrary general policy when in October, 1961, he advised counsel in the
celebrated Sabbatino case, 8 which involved a Cuban act of state, that
since it and other similar cases "are at present before the courts, any
comments on this question by the Department of State would be out
of place."29 Judge Waterman spoke truly when he characterized the Department's recent letters as "somewhat ambiguous." 3 In the light of
the long accepted past practice, however, the only questions to be considered now are (1) whether the State Department does not have a duty
to give guidance to the courts in unequivocal terms whenever an issue
like sovereign immunity arises, and (2) the extent of the obligation of
the courts to give effect to the executive's suggestions. In the Bahia de
Nipe case the State Department obviously felt impelled to act quickly
and decisively, and the courts felt that it was their "duty to give judicial
support to that decision,"31 since the suggestion made "by the State
Department in this matter affecting our foreign relations, withdraws it
from the sphere of litigation."" The ship was ordered released. If we
wish to support this result, we must be prepared to accept a very far23 45 Dep't State Bull. 407-08 (1961).
24 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 24 U.S. (7 Cranch) 287 (1812).
25 Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
26 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); see
Comment, 40 Cornell L.Q. 547, 551 (1955).
27 Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
28 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted 31 U.S.L. Week 3255 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963), 60 Mich.
L. Rev. 231 (1961); 47 Cornell L.Q. 659 (1962); 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1278 (1962); Lillich,
"Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The Second Circuit and Sabbatino," 8 Vill. L. Rev. 155
(1963); Stevenson, "The Sabbatino Case-Three Steps Forward and Two Steps Back," 57
Am. J. Int'l L. 97 (1963). Cf. Preuss, "Immunity of Officers and Employees of the United
Nations for Official Acts: The Ranallo Case," 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 555, 557 (1947).
29 307 F.2d 845, 858 (2d Cir. 1962).
30 Ibid.
31 Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, SA., 197 F. Supp. 710, 726 (E.D. Va. 1961).
32 Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, SA., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961).
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reaching executive influence in many kinds of court proceedings having
international ramifications.
Observe what occurred when the Bahia de Nipe and her cargo were
declared to be immune from the jurisdiction of our courts. Before either
ship or cargo could be accepted as owned by the Cuban government, the
act of nationalization had to be recognized. This could be done only if,
under the act of state doctrine, the failure to compensate adequately is
not allowed to invalidate the seizure. The decision of the district court
in the Sabbatino case,8 3 despite its reliance on expressions of executive
views, could not be followed. Further, the intention expressed in the Tate
letter, 34 that the Department of State would thereafter refrain from
suggesting immunity in cases involving transactions that are commercial
in nature, would have to be overlooked or overruled, at least for the
time being. It must be assumed that the State Department concluded
as a matter of policy (a) not to relieve the courts from the restraints
that are imposed, supposedly in the interest of comity, by the act of state
doctrine and that would prevent the courts from questioning the validity
of the act of the Cuban state in nationalizing the ship and the sugar, 5
and (b) to deviate from the doctrine of the Tate letter and make the
suggestion of immunity. Our question, then, is whether the courts
properly perform or abdicate their judicial function when they let their
decisions be guided by such pronouncements of policy. Their duty, of
course, is to apply the law to the facts.8 6 Where does an executive suggestion fit into the syllogism that, in view of the facts as found and the
law as it exists, the judgment necessarily follows? The answer differs
slightly in each of the situations in which executive suggestions are made,
but generally it may be stated that the nation's foreign policy qualifies
the way the rule of law applies to the case. Let us examine how this
proposition works in the various relevant situations, starting with those
cases in which the concept of "comity" is said to be the motivating
force.
THE INFLUENCE OF COMITY

"In the interest of international comity" in the relations among nations, a number of special practices have developed to such an extent
that they are widely treated as customary rules of international law.
33 Note 28 supra.
34 The Tate Letter, 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952).
35 Compare Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres SA., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), with Berstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1954), Comment, 40 Cornell L.Q. 547, 551 (1955).

36 See Jaffe, "Judicial Review: Question of Law," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239 (1955).
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When a court is asked to apply one of these rules, it behooves the judge
to bear this origin in mind. It will guide him in deciding how the rule
applies to the case before him. Let us examine in some detail the major
areas where comity is the wellspring of the rule of international law.
Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is perhaps the best example of a rule of international law derived from the demands of "comity" among supposedly
friendly nations. As Justice Marshall made clear in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, sovereign immunity is a derogation from "the
perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns." 37 The host
sovereign, in other words, agrees to waive his "full and absolute territorial
jurisdiction" when another friendly sovereign, his delegate or his property, is in the host's territory. This waiver, a specific recognition of the
guest sovereign's independence, results from a "common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse. 38 1
Certain assumptions reflected in these words must not be overlooked
when a court is confronted with a case in which the defendant is alleged
to be entitled to immunity as a sovereign. Not only does the rule assume
that it is a "sovereign" or a sovereign's property that is to be released,
but a "friendly" one.39 It assumes that there is a "common interest"
which will be served by the grant of immunity. In the absence of any
of these elements, the rule of The Exchange, at least, does not apply.
Who is best able to determine whether these elements exist? Whether
or not the claimant is a "sovereign" is similar to the question of recognition: is the defendant an independent member of the family of nations?
This is one of those "political questions" on which courts always say
they defer to the "political arm" of the government, because it is best
able to decide them. Recognition is for the executive, and the courts,
with the approval even of critics of deference to executive intervention,
invariably accept the declaration of the Department of State on the
status of a nation and the recognition of a regime."' In view of this practice it is a curiosity of history that the New York Court of Appeals saw
fit in 1923 to declare the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic"
immune to suit in the courts of New York by the former owner of a
41
quantity of furs seized in Russia under a nationalization program. Of
37

24 U.S. (7 Cranch) 287 (1812).

38 Id. at 294..

39 International Law in National Courts 9-14 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on
Int'l Law (1960)).
40 See Jessup, 'Sfas the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions"? 40 Am. J.
Int'l L. 168, 169 (1946); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
41 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24
(1923).
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course there was a "State of Russia" in 1923 and it was currently allowed
to institute suits in our courts.' But as far as the United States Government was concerned the people who set up the RSFSR and seized all
private property in Russia were "a band of robbers," not the government
of the State of Russia. In the eyes of the State Department that government was the Kerensky regime, represented in the United States by
Ambassador Bakhmetieff and his staff.43 For the New York Court of
Appeals to call the Bolshevik regime "an existing government, sovereign
within its own territories,"44 was as surprising as it would be for an
American court in 1963 to refer in similar terms to the regime of Mao
Tse Tung in Communist controlled Chinese territory. It would be understandable if the judges, as observers of history in the making, were
simply unable to go along with the fiction that a long-exiled regime remains the government of a nation while another group has consolidated
its active control. Ten years later, while the executive position had not
changed, the same court said, in another case involving the acts of the
Soviet Russian regime, "We all know that it is a government. The State
Department knows it, the courts, the nations, the man on the street."4
In these cases the court was speaking as though faced with a determination by an administrative agency unsupported by anything in the record.
What was overlooked in the Wulfsohn case, however, was the element
of international comity. Was the suit being brought against a sovereign
friendly to the United States with which there was "a common interest
impelling them to mutual intercourse"? That would have been hard to
find in a day when the red Bolsheviki were being denounced by the
President himself as flouting "the cherished rights of humanity." 46
Would it contribute to friendly international relations to accord the
entity called the RSFSR that immunity from "complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction . . .which has been stated to be the attribute of
every nation"? 41 If asked this question, the Secretary of State would
surely have pointed to the complete absence of any friendship between
the nations and asked how a suit in our courts over title to expropriated
American property-one of the very causes of the unfriendliness-could
possibly make relations any worse. One would expect the same reaction
48
to a request for immunity for an enemy government.
42 E.g., Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1927). Cf. P. & E. Shipping
Corp. v. Banco Para El Comercio Ext. De Cuba, 307 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962); Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
43 See Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Russia, note 42 supra, at 400.
44 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, note 41 supra, at 376.
45 Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 226, 186 N.E. 679, 682 (1933).
46 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 302 (1940).
47 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 24 U.S. (7 Cranch) 287, 294 (1812).
48 Compare Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
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Contrast this situation involving Russia in 1923 with the Bahia de Nipe
situation in 1961. The Secretary of State in the latter case was deeply
involved in the problems presented by the evolution of a communist
government in our own good neighborhood. He was certain that if the
vessel were held to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, relations
with Cuba, bad as they were, would be seriously worsened. There were
good reasons for this belief, which the judges could readily gather from
the news of the day. In view of this certainty, the Secretary of State
used all available means of modern communication to be sure that the
courts knew his views. What grains of comity still remained in our
tenuous relations with Cuba would be likely to run out, he said in effect.
Using that circumlocution known as diplomatic language, his message
told the court that release of the vessel "would avoid further disturbance
'49
to our international relations in the premises.
In the light of that kind of representation, especially when supported
by such obvious justification in the public press, what function does a
court perform in a sovereign immunity case? Surely all the judge may do
is to dismiss the proceedings. If, like the judges in the Bahia de Nipe
example, he says that he does so simply because "it is the duty of this
court to give judicial support to that decision" of the President and his
Secretary of State, he has properly applied the rule of law that provides
for sovereign immunity when required in the interest of comity and denies
the immunity when it would not serve that interest. This seems to be
precisely what Chief Justice Stone was saying when, speaking for the
Court in Mexico v. Hoffman, he stated that "it is therefore not for the
courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow,
or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not
seen fit to recognize."5 Despite the Restatement's doubt as to the intended breadth of this statement, 51 it is not, as feared by Philip Jessup,52 "abdication" of the judicial function because it is not for the
courts to evaluate the demands of comity in foreign relations. This is a
Cir. 1951), with Telkes v. Hungarian Nat'l Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 38 N.Y.S.2d 419
(1st Dep't 1942). See also [1922] Foreign Rel., vol. II, 709-14 (1938), discussing Oliver Am.
Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924).
49 Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, SA., note 31 supra, at 714.
50 Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945). See Lillich, "The Geneva Conference on
the Law of the Sea and the Immunity of Foreign State-Owned Commercial Vessels," 28
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 408, 412-15 (1960). Cf. Mann, "Judiciary and Executive in Foreign
Affairs," 29 Transact. Grot. Soc'y 143 (1943).
51 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 75, at 250 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
52 Jessup, supra note 40. Cf. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations 233-36 (1933).
Dickinson, "The Law of Nations as National Law: 'Political Questions'," 104 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 451 (1956); McDougal, "The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A
Policy-Oriented Perspective," 4 S.D.L. Rev. 25 (1959).
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function that belongs to "the department of our government charged
with the conduct of our foreign relations."53 That department is not then
deciding "the basic legal principle governing the immunity,15 4 but only
the presence or absence of a factual situation that invokes the immunity.
The Restatement says that a suggestion by the State Department on
sovereign immunity "is conclusive as to issues of fact or law which relate
to matters within the exclusive competence of the executive branch of
the government. .

. ."

The existence or absence of relations between

governments depending on comity in a particular situation is such a
matter, and consequently it is proper for the courts to accept the executive determination as binding.
On these assumptions the Tate letter of 1952 can be viewed in its
proper perspective. It reflected the conclusion of the Department of State
that the conditions of world trade in 1952 were such that the granting of
immunity to suit in our courts for governments engaging in commercelike activities was not necessary in the interest of good relations, i.e., of
comity. This was not a wholly novel view, of course, because it had been
the view also of the Department when Hughes was Secretary of State
and had been applied in many foreign countries. 6 After the unfortunate
57
decision of the Supreme Court in 1926 in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro,
however, where the court had granted immunity despite the State Department's adverse suggestion, the Department had felt obliged to suggest immunity regardless of the nature of the foreign sovereign's activity.
This attitude came to an end after "a long, long process" of research had
shown that the Americans and the British "were pretty much in a corner
by ourselves" in adhering to it."8 The "'Tate letter" was sent to the Attorney General, advising him that thereafter the State Department would
follow "the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity" in the consideration
of requests by foreign governments for suggestions of immunity.
It is unfortunate that this letter was not couched clearly in language
showing, as the Government's memorandum to the Supreme Court in
the Rich proceedings emphasized, 59 that it was stating a conclusion in the
53 Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 42 (1945) (concurring opinion). Cf. National Bank
v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 366 (1955) (dissent).
U4 Jessup, supra note 40, at 169. Cf. International Law in National Courts 4 (Third
Cornell Summer Conference on Intl Law 1960).
55 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 75, at 246 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
56 See, The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 39 (1945).
57 Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
658Comment by Jack B. Tate, Proceedings 70 (First Cornell Summer Conference on
Int'l Law 1958); Comment by Raymund T. Yingling, International Law in National
Courts 13 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on Intl Law 1960).
59 That letter does set forth the considerations which the Department will take into
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field of foreign policy, namely, that immunity was considered necessary
as matter of comity only in the restricted area of "sovereign or public
acts (jure imperii)." Then the letter need not have deferentially stated
that "it is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control
the courts." The fact is that statements of policy in this area have had
almost absolute control over the outcome of the cases, for never has a
court failed to grant immunity in the face of a positive suggestion of
immunity by the Department of State.60 The Department should gladly
accept its responsibility in these cases, because the aims of foreign policy
can thereby be furthered. Although courts have sometimes acted without
executive guidance and the Restatement recognizes that foreign governments may suggest immunity directly to the courts,61 the Department
of State should expect that it will always be consulted by attorneys and
judges, as well as by diplomats, when the issue appears in court, because
the court cannot decide the case in a policy vacuum. It must hear from
the foreign relations area whether or not comity requires immunity in
this particular case. In the absence of positive word from that source, a
court has no reason to refrain from deciding the case on the merits. 2
It will be said that the courts can by themselves decide whether or
not a case involves governmental or private activities, and whether or
not the property before them belongs to the foreign government at all. 3
Of course they can, but these issues decide the sovereign immunity question only when the State Department says so. This is clearly demonaccount in determining whether or not to recognize a claim of immunity by a foreign
sovereign. But it is wholly and solely a guide to the State Department's own policy,
not the declaration of a rule of law or even of an unalterable policy position; and, in
addition, it sets forth only some of the governing considerations and does not purport
to be all-inclusive or exclusive. . . . Although the consistency or inconsistency of the
Department's position is not relevant to this judicial proceeding, it does bear emphasis
that the circumstances surrounding the coming of this ship into United States waters
were most extraordinary. . . . These were all elements to be considered by the State
Department. Whether or not one agrees, as a matter of policy, with its ultimate
determination, the legally relevant fact is that that recognition . . .puts an end to the
matter.
Memorandum on behalf of the United States, filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in connection with application for a stay pending action on petition for writ of certiorari in Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, SA., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) quoted in Rabinowitz, "Immunity of
State-Owned Ships and Barratry, 1962 J. Bus. L. 89, 91, and in I International Legal Materials-Current Documents, Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 288-89 (1962). Cf. Jessup, The Use of
International Law 78-79 (1959).
60 M. H. Cardozo, supra note 7; Comment by Raymund T. Yingling, supra note 58,
at 4. Quaere as to Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 12 N.Y.2d 781, - N.E.2d -, 235
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
61 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 74, 75 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
62 Cf. Comment by Raymund T. Yingling, supra note 58, at 13; "Summer Survey: International Law in the New York Courts-1956," 42 Cornell L.Q. 521, 533 (1957).
63 Cf. Drachsler, "Some Observations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter," 54 Am.
J. Int'l L. 790 (1960), discussing Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086,
192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. Westch. County 1959).
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strated by the case of the Bahia de Nipe. Surely carrying sugar across
the seas in commerce is the kind of activity that the Tate letter was
intended to cover. But the State Department nonetheless suggested immunity, obviously because the general principle that comity does not
require immunity in such cases had to give way to the particular fact
that in this case it was required. The courts rightly accepted the Department's determination as impelling them to grafit the immunity as a matter of law, because the rule says that a recognized foreign sovereign is
immune to jurisdiction in our courts when the comity of nations calls for
it.
The Department of State will have to decide, in many cases, whether
the activity of the defendant government is "governmental" or "private,"
since, under the Tate letter, this will be the issue that determines the
outcome of the application for immunity. Is this question to be decided
by a court or by the Department? Here we must bear in mind the purpose
of sovereign immunity, that is, to avoid forcing a friendly foreign sovereign to undergo the indignity of responding in the court of another
sovereign. He is not supposed to have to argue his immunity in court.
He need only appear in diplomatic channels and then, if the host government recognizes that his claim is proper, the latter advises the court of
the needs of international comity. The friendly foreign sovereign cannot
be expected to go before a judge in a court of first instance and argue
that his activity is governmental, not private. This issue must be thrashed
out in the diplomatic exchange and the court advised of the decision by
the executive branch. The United States Government certainly seeks
this treatment when sued abroad.6 4 The State Department will have to
develop a set of principles on which to rely in making its determination
for cases arising in this country.6 5 Even then it may sometimes decide
that for reasons of policy the Tate letter must be wholly disregarded,
as it presumably did in the Bahia de Nipe case. It cannot escape its
responsibility by abdicating it to the courts. As already stated, of course,
this responsibility includes a duty to hear both sides of the case; although that learned commentator, Edwin D. Dickinson, considered it
fortunate that the State Department "has not attempted to hold hearings
or conduct trials,"66 this is the only way the plaintiff will have his
day in court.
64 Leonard, "The United States as a Litigant in Foreign Courts," Proceedings, Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. 95 (1958).
65 Cf. Bishop, "New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity," 47 Am. J. Int'l
L. 93 (1953); Timberg, "Expropriation Measures and State Trading," Proceedings, Am.
Soc'l Int'l L. 113 (1961).
66 Dickinson, supra note 52, at 478. See also discussion at note 12 supra.
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The problem of who decides questions of title to property involved in
claims to immunity asserted by foreign governments is another very
delicate matter of division of responsibility. 7 The State Department's
"suggestions" have typically stated that it "accepts as true" the allegations as to ownership of property made by the ambassador of a foreign
country that someone is trying to sue here. Although it may not have
been the intentional policy of the Department to make such a statement
when there was a dispute over ownership, 68 it has occasionally done so
without a discussion of the issue. 9 Perhaps this has resulted from the
absence of notice to the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the suggestion.
The courts, however, have assumed that it is their function to decide the
question of title, and perhaps it is. A State Department lawyer, influential in this field, has stated that "where the ownership of securities
is in doubt, the State Department does not make a suggestion of immunity, because the very basis on which the suggestion would be made
would be uncertain. 70
This position, however, does not solve the problem. In the first place,
the result of refusing a suggestion in the face of a dispute of ownership
is to force the foreign sovereign into a domestic court to protect its asserted right. This is the affront that is supposed to be avoided by the
immunity doctrine. It is naturally to be hoped that foreign governments
will often be willing to litigate this issue in our courts, recognizing that
arguing the point before judicial officers is probably no more undignified
than arguing before diplomats. But, they will sometimes be unwilling to
do this, as would probably be the case if the United States were asked
to do the same thing abroad. 7 The question of title then must be determined by the State Department before it can decide whether or not to
make a suggestion of immunity. If the State Department holds a hearing
on this issue, with notice to all interested parties and other "basic procedural safeguards, '72 it could make a determination of ownership. Then,
acting on this determination, it could make or refuse the suggestion to
the court, as an exercise of its responsibility to advise the court of the
67 International Law in National Courts 11, 12 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on
Int'l Law 1960). Cf. Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U.S. 503 (1921); U.S.S.R. v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Note, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 396 (1962).
68 Comment by Raymund T. Yingling, supra note 58, at 11.
69 See Frazier v. Hanover Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1953), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 861, 119 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1953); Stephen v. Zivnostenska
Banka, 23 Misc. 2d 855,) 199 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
70 Comment by Raymund T. Yingling, supra note 58, at 11.
71 International Law in National Courts 19-24 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on
Int'l Law 1960). Leonard, "The United States as a Litigant in Foreign Courts," Proceedings,
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 95 (1958).
72 Cf. Timberg, "Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception," in
Essays on International jurisdiction 57 (Ohio State 1961).
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demands of comity. The court would then have the necessary foundation
on which to grant or deny the immunity. For the plaintiff to lose in this
kind of situation would be no more of a hardship than to be relegated to
diplomatic negotiations in any sovereign immunity case; one of the
burdens of dealing with governments is subjection to special channels
when pursuing claims against them.
Despite this view, however, it is also true that it would not be a particular hardship or indignity to a friendly foreign sovereign to be required
to prove its ownership of particular property in one of our courts. For
the Department of State to adhere to the view that this is the better
policy would be no more startling or objectionable than deciding, as it
did in the Tate letter, to require foreign governments to respond in our
courts when they engage in commercial activities here. What is important, however, is that it make its position clear, which has not always
been the case. 73 The court should be advised firmly whether or not immunity will be expected if the property is found to belong to the
sovereign defendant.
Act of State
If we now return to the Rich case, involving the Bahia de Nipe and its
cargo of sugar, we may be puzzled by the absence of any consideration
in the opinions of the courts of the question of ownership of the vessel
and the sugar. This was the whole issue in the Sabbatino case, where
there was no problem of sovereign immunity. But if the ownership issue
had been resolved in the Rich case as it was in Sabbatino, the cargo would
have been found to belong to a private claimant and consequently not
immune from attachment here. Evidently the former owner of the S.S.
Bahia de Nipe did not appear to claim title, but perhaps the other plaintiffs could have raised the issue in order to defeat the claim of sovereign
immunity. The owner of the sugar, however, did appear, and lost, presumably because of the act of state doctrine.
The issue of ownership here, of course, depends on the act of state
doctrine,74 not the usual principles of personal property law. That docDrachsler, supra note 63; Comment by Raymund T. Yingling, supra note 58, at 13.
See Memorandum on Behalf of the United States, filed with the U.S. Supreme Court
in connection with application for a stay pending action on petition for writ of certiorari in
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba SA., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), quoted in I International Legal
Materials, supra note 59 and Rabinowitz, supra note 59.
There has been a spate of writing on the act of state doctrine in the past few years, much
of it in response to a report of the international law committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York. 14 Record N.Y.C.B.A. 228 (1959). See Hyde, "The Act of
State Doctrine and The Rule of Law," 53 Am. J.Int'l L. 635 (1959); Reeves, "Act of State
Doctrine and The Rule of Law-A Reply," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 141 (1960); Metzger, "The
Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations," 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 881 (1962) and in
Metzger, International Law, Trade and Finance 66-77 (1962); Zander, "The Act of State
73

74
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trine, like sovereign immunity, has its basis in the demands of comity
among friendly sovereigns. 75 This means that the views of the executive
branch here, too, must be given special heed. The basis of the doctrine
is the assumption that a nation would commit an unfriendly act-would
"vex the peace of nations" 7 -- if its courts questioned the validity of the
act of another nation with respect to property located in the latter's
territory, and possibly property belonging to the latter's citizens, regardless of its location. The courts consider the rule as a restraint on the
exercise of their jurisdiction, imposed in the interest of international
relations. In our courts, it has been a natural development, that, when
the executive branch makes it clear that in a particular case this restraint
is not necessary as a matter of comity, the courts are relieved of the
restraint and free to look into the validity of the other government's
act. 77 Immediately this raises a familiar issue in the area of separation
of powers: Are the courts going to agree that their jurisdiction to consider
a matter may be determined by a statement emanating from the executive
branch? What now is the "judicial function"?
The debate has continued heatedly.78 Some have urged that the courts
should consider themselves prima facie free, regardless of executive
pronouncement or silence, to disregard any act of state that violates
international law. The Restatement agrees that this is the rule when the
act affects property outside the territory of the acting state, but it expresses no opinion on it for property located within such territory.79
Others have argued that the courts must ignore expressions of executive
policy if there is judicial precedent pointing to the proper result.80
Surely there can be found a solution to the problem that will reconcile
respect for the judicial function with the demands of international
comity.
Doctrine," 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 826 (1959); Comments, 11 De Paul L. Rev. 76 (1961);
58 Mich. L. Rev. 100 (1959).
7 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918). See also Comment by
Edward D. Re, International Law in National Courts 63 (Third Cornell Summer Conference
on Int'l Law 1960) citing Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun 596, 599 (2d Dep't 1876), and Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895).
76 Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Cf.
Comment by Hardy Dillard, Institutional Law in National Courts 102-03 (Third Cornell
Summer Conference on Int'l Law 1960).
77 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); see
Comment, 40 Cornell L.Q. 547, 551 (1955).
78 Reeves, supra note 74; Stevenson, "The Sabbatino Case-Three Steps Forward and
Two Steps Back," 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 97 (1963). See International Law in National Courts
79 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on Int'l Law 1960).
79 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 43, 46 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962). Cf. Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank,
253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930).
80 Borchard, "Extraterritorial Confiscations," 36 Am. J. Intl L. 275 (1942). Jessup, supra
note 40.
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Let us lift a page from the practice in the sovereign immunity cases.
First, if international comity does not demand judicial restraint-if the
adjudication will not "vex the peace of nations"-then there is no possible reason for the exercise of restraint. The famous Bernstein case is
a perfect example."' When Mr. Bernstein was seeking to regain his ships
by libelling them in New York waters, the government whose racist acts
had deprived him of his property was gone with the winds that carried
away the smoke from Hitler's funeral pyre. A decision in 1947 by a
court in New York that those confiscatory acts were invalid and unenforceable would merely confirm what had already been declared to be
the policy and the law of the new government of Germany. No peaceful
relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany
would by any stretch of imagination be vexed by such a decision. Consequently it was not surprising, but entirely proper, for the State Department to state publicly the executive policy that courts were relieved
from the restraint of the act of state doctrine. As Judge Clark pointed
out in his dissent, "the authentic voice of our Executive" had been
heard during the "classic excoriation" of the Nazi leaders at Nuremberg."2
Without clear evidence of such policy, however, found either in general
statements by the executive branch or in comments on particular acts,
the courts should assume that the restraint applies when an act of a
recognized, i.e., friendly, foreign government is involved. 3 The act
should then be given effect without an examination of its validity on
any grounds-not international law; not foreign law; not domestic law;
not public policy. This, like the sovereign immunity situation, is no
abdication of judicial function, but the proper application of a rule of
law that has its only justification in the exigencies of foreign relations.
It would be no departure from the United States precedents to accept
this formulation of the rule when the property affected by the act of
state was located in the territory of the acting country.8 4 For property
located elsewhere, the approach has really been the reverse: the courts
have considered themselves generally free to question the validity of the
act. 5 Once the executive has spoken unequivocally, however, and has
81 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954);
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres SA., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
772 (1949). See Comment, 40 Cornell L.Q. 547, 551 (1955). See also Comment by Victor
House, International Law in National Courts 76-78 (Third Cornell Summer Conference
on Int'l Law 1960).
82 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 1947). Comment
by Edward D. Re, supra note 75, at 75; Comment by Hardy Dillard, id. at 101-02.
83 See Metzger, supra note 74.
84 Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); Cf. A. M.
Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 1 K.B. 456, [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
85 Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758
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declared that it is the policy of the government to give extraterritorial
effect to such an extreme act, the Supreme Court has held, in the Pink
case," that the courts of the nation may not question its validity. In view
of the general acceptance of the principle that the territorial boundaries
of a nation also measure the extent of its legislative power as far as
property is concerned, little vexing of the peace of nations is likely to
result from this converse operation of the act of state doctrine as to
property abroad. When the executive speaks, however, with respect to
acts affecting such property, the spirit of the Pink and Belmont" cases
should constrain the courts to give effect to the policy. If the judges
should feel free to make their own determination of validity, as the
members of the New York Court of Appeals seemed to do in the
Transandine case,88 some unwelcome vexing of peaceful relations may
result. Fortunately, in that case New York policy was found to be
consistent with federal policy, and the protective nationalization by the
Netherlands government was given effect. If it had not, it "might involve
very serious consequences," to quote Judge Lehman's opinion.
In the Sabbatino case Judge Dimock held that the "self-imposed
restraint" on courts, having its origin in "our conflict of laws principles
... clearly would not extend to an act of state which was in violation of
international law." 9 The court of appeals upheld this view." Even
though Judge Dimock invoked public denunciations by the executive
branch of the Cuban confiscations, his and the court of appeals' assumption that their independent findings of invalidity under international law
warranted their refusal to enforce the Cuban actions was an unfortunate
departure from the act of state rule as it must be applied if we are to
avoid the risk that court decisions will "vex the peace of nations." Of
course, we must recall the state of our relations with Cuba in the winter
of 1961, when the executive branch was abetting a plot for the forceful
overthrow of the Castro regime. In such an atmosphere, the State Department might well have then said to the court, as in the Bernstein
case, "go ahead and decide the issue of validity. An adverse decision
cannot hurt our relations with Cuba."
(1939), aff'd per curiam, 309 U.S. 624 (1939); Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co.,
263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934); Petrogradsky Meidunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v.
National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930).
86 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); see M. H. Cardozo, "The Authority in
Internal Law of International Treaties: The Pink Case," 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 544 (1962).
87 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Cf. Gonzalez v. Industrial Bank,
12 N.Y.2d 33, - N.E.2d -, 234 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1962).
88 Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
89 193 F. Supp. 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
90 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. Week 3255 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963).
See Lillich, "A Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The Second Circuit and Sabbatino," 8 Vill.
L. Rev. 155 (1963).
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A few months later, however, the picture had changed. The United
States had recently been embarrassed by ill-conceived measures in the
struggle over Castroism. In August the executive branch found it politic
and presumably entirely proper to tell the court in which the Bahia de
Nipe matter was pending that prompt release of the ship was "necessary
to secure observance of the rights and obligations of the United States."'"
We must conclude that the Department of State would have been most
disturbed if the courts had proceeded to follow the Sabbatino precedent
on the issue of title to that vessel and its cargo of sugar and had held
that Cuba did not own the ship or the sugar because the nationalization
was in violation of international law. Here there certainly would have
been "embarrassment to the executive" if the act of state doctrine had
not been applied in its full force, namely, that the validity of the acts of
a recognized foreign government in its own territory will not be questioned on any ground unless the executive gives the word that releases
the restraint.
In a decision delivered just three days before the hijacking of the
Eastern Air Lines plane, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia had applied the doctrine in this way in the Pons case, 92 where
Pons' claim for damages was based on the alleged illegality of the Cuban
nationalization of his property. That court, recognizing its obligation to
be guided by the demands of comity, if there were any, had sought
guidance from the State and Justice Departments, but no word had been
received from either. The majority of the court, therefore, felt constrained to refuse review of the Cubans' act of state. In dissenting,
Judge Burger thought that Cuba, coming in as plaintiff, had exposed
itself to judicial review of its own acts.93 Evidently the State Department, when it received the court's inquiry in April, amid the confusion
of the intervention in the Bay of Pigs, could not get around to stating
whether or not recognition by our courts of confiscatory acts by the
Cubans was necessary to good relations between the two nations. In
August it was clearly necessary. When October and November had
rolled around, however, the climate had changed and the dust had
settled. The United States was once more in a position to be firm with
Castro. Consequently the Department of State was not concerned over
the possibility that the court of appeals might affirm Judge Dimock's
decision in Sabbatino. By its express refusal to comment, it said, in effect
"Go ahead and make your decision. It cannot vex our relations with
91 197 F. Supp. 710, 715 (E.D. Va. 1961):
92
93

Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Cf. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).

1963]

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

Cuba however you may decide." When silence can be interpreted so
clearly, perhaps there is no objection to refusing to speak up. But when
silence is ambiguous, "courteous neutrality" can be an abdication of
responsibility and can even lead to a result that is the opposite of what
is really desired.94 In a situation as delicate as our relations with Cuba
in 1961, surely the Department of State should not leave the courts in
the dark as to policy that so often shapes their decisions. Perhaps it may
be excused because the very delicacy of those relations made it impossible for the various executive departments to formulate an agreed position to be communicated to the courts. Someone, however, evidently
found authority to tell a Florida court during this period that it was
free to go ahead and review the Cuban acts."5
Once the executive branch has relieved the courts from restraint
against reviewing the validity of a foreign act of state, then, of course,
the courts have the authority and responsibility of making an independent
study of its validity. Furthermore, their doing so furnishes no ground
for complaint by the acting government, since, as the Restatement emphasizes, 96 judicial restraint is never a requirement of international law,
but only of comity. Without the exigencies of comity, review becomes a
judicial function. Freedom to review can develop from an express executive pronouncement for a particular case, a general statement for all
cases emanating out of a particular government's course of action, or a
fair implication" from public declarations and positions of the executive
branch. Perhaps it would further the rule of law in the international
scene if the President should declare to the world that our courts are
hereafter free to review the validity under international law of the acts
of any nation.97 The door would have to be left open, however, for reimposition of restraint when a case like the Bahia de Nipe comes up in a
heated political atmosphere. When the relief from restraint is clear,
however, the courts are free to review the act's validity under the law
of the acting nation or under international law. How they determine
validity under the law of the other country is a very intriguing question,
beyond the scope of this article.9 It is also beyond the scope of this
94 Compare Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E.2d 81 (1939), with
Miller v. Ferrocarrill del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688 (1941).
95 Kane v. National Institute of Agrarian Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116 (Cir. Ct. Dade
County 1961). See Bayitch, "International Law," 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 240, 271-72 (1961);
Note, N.Y.L.F. 148, 154 (1962).
96 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 41, comment (g) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
97 Resolution of the Bar Association of the City of N.Y., Record N.Y.C.B.A. Vol. 14,

No. 6, p. 228 (June, 1959); Hyde, supra note 74. Cf. Reeves, supra note 74; Metzger, supra
note 74.
98 Cf. Comments by Martin Domke and Karl H. Neumayer, International Law in National Courts 87-88, 99-100, 101 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on Int'l Law 1960).
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article to suggest how the court is to determine whether the act is valid
under international law,99 except in one respect: how much weight should
the courts give to statements on this point by the Department of State
and its representatives? The answer must be, no more weight than is
given to the statements and writings of any experts in a field of law
involved in cases before a court. The political officers and the lawyers
in the Department of State do not declare the law, though they may
appear before the courts to argue it as specialists in the legal aspects of
international affairs. 0 0 Then they are only speaking as attorneys, not as
makers of policy, as they do when declaring the governmental position
as to the demands of comity.
Public policy in this area is as unruly as it is anywhere. It goes without saying (but the Restatement correctly does say)' 0 -that public policy
cannot be the ground for refusal to give effect to an act of state when
the restraints of the act of state doctrine apply. That doctrine then
bears to the international case the same relation as the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution bears to an interstate case: public policy
of the forum may not excuse enforcement." °2 When the restraint of the
doctrine has been lifted, however, by means of a statement by the executive branch, the court is free to deny effect to a foreign government's
act on public policy grounds. The influence of foreign policy and the
demands of comity then do not require the judge to avoid any ground
he may select in reviewing the act. If he thinks he has the "unruly
horse"' 3 under control, and that recourse to public policy is not a facile
"substitute for analysis" of a choice of law problem, :04 he may ride it as
well as any other mount to reach his conclusion as to the validity of the
act in question.
99 Comment by Myres S. McDougal, Proceedings 68-80 (Second Cornell Summer Conference on Int'l Law 1958). Falk, "Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic
Courts in the International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino," 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 19-23 (1961); Baade, "Indonesian Nationalization
Measures Before Foreign Courts-A Reply," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 801 (1960); Baade, "The
Validity of Foreign Confiscations: An Addendum," 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 504 (1962); Domke,
"Foreign Nationalizations," 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 585 (1961); Seidi-Hohenveldern, "Title to
Confiscated Foreign Property and Public International Law," 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 507 (1962).
100 Cf. International Bank v. All America Cables, FCC Docket No. 9362, decided
March 23, 1953, 8 Pike & Fischer, Radio Regulation 927 (1953); Falk, supra note 99;
Moore, "The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings," 31 Fordham L. Rev.
277, 301 (1962).
-01 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 43 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
102 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
103 Katzenbach, "Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in
Interstate and International Law," 65 Yale LJ. 1087 (1956). Cf. Waterman, J., in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861 (2d Cir. 1962).
104 Paulsen & Sovern, "'Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws," 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969,
1016 (1956).
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Diplomatic Immunity
One of the vital strands that support the comity of nations is diplomatic immunity, a sort of subsidiary of sovereign immunity. As in the
latter cases courts have often accepted an obligation to grant or deny
immunity to individual diplomats in accordance with certificates from
the State Department. There has been no quarrel with their following
State Department certification that a person is actually a diplomatic
representative of another recognized government.'0 5 Only the President
or his Secretary of State can decide whether an envoy of any rank will
be or has been received by our Government to represent another country.
Consequently, evidence of that executive reception is the only indication
on which a court can rely when confronted with a claim of diplomatic
immunitr. The appearance of a name in a diplomatic list issued by the
executive branch, is, of course, good evidence that the person named is a
diplomat. Only a certificate from the State Department, however, can
provide assurance that the list is accurate as of the crucial date.
No special problem in diplomatic immunity arises when a person is
duly listed as an accredited representative of a recognized regime. When
the listing has been certified, it is, in the words of the Restatement, "conclusive in the courts,"'1 6 and they accord the immunity.1 7 When the
defendant, however, is not so listed, but claims the immunity, how does
the court decide the question? It should go without saying that such a
person, and probably even a listed person, should never be declared immune without some indication from the State Department that it would
be appropriate. Since immunity is a means of achieving comity and
creating an atmosphere in which diplomatic relations can be made
reciprocally effective, the court must know whether the demands of
comity and diplomacy call for immunity in the case before it. If the
Department says, "No, it is not necessary for foreign relations reasons,"
then what ground can support it? Failure to grant the immunity will not,
in the opinion of that agency exclusively qualified to know, vex the
peace of the United States with its friends.
The more difficult problem is the case of the unlisted person for whom
the State Department feels that immunity is important to prevent, for
foreign policy reasons, friction in our foreign relations. Whom should
105 Jessup, "Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions"? 40 Am. J. Int'l .
168 (1946).
106 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 78 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
107 Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Friedberg v. Santa Cruz, 193 Misc.
599, 84 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1948); DeMiglio v. Paez, 18 Misc. 2d 914,
189 N.Y.S.2d 593 (2d Dep't 1959); Tsiang v. Tsiang, 194 Misc. 259, 86 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
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the Department certify, and is it free to certify anyone it feels like?
What amount of deference should the courts give to the certificate when
it is issued?
Answering these questions in inverse order, the rule of law to be applied by the courts might well be similar to the rule in sovereign immunity
cases: a person is entitled to diplomatic immunity when the foreign relations branch of the government certifies him as eligible for it. By drawing
on the field of administrative law for guidance, it could be added that
a rule of reason modifies this principle, so that the executive branch must
be able to show some factual ground for its certification before it will be
considered binding. This would mean that, for example, anyone bearing
a foreign diplomatic passport, or employed by and representing a foreign
government, or accredited to or employed by an international 8rganization, could properly be certified if the State Department determined it
to be necessary 08 Given some such attribute of diplomatic status, the
courts, under the view advocated here, should hold that the person so
certified is to be granted the traditional immunities of the diplomat. 1' 9
No effort will be made here to list the categories of persons to whom
the State Department should accord the privilege. There are, however,
some interesting examples that demonstrate the importance of latitude in
making the decisions and of deference by the courts to those decisions.
In 1960 Igor Melekh had been arrested in the United States and charged
with violation of espionage laws. The Soviet government insisted that
Melekh was entitled to diplomatic immunity by virtue of his position in
the Soviet foreign service and his employment in the Russian language
section of the United Nations. The State Department certified to the
federal district court in New York City that its records showed no evidence that Melekh held a position that entitled him to diplomatic immunity from prosecution. The issue was duly argued in court and then
Judge Herlands prepared a long, carefully reasoned analysis of the opposing positions, concluding that there was no immunity. 10 If the

approach advocated here had been followed, of course, the judge would
have been spared all his research into the history and statutes relating
to diplomatic immunity. He could have said that, since the executive
branch was taking the position that the prosecution would not embarrassingly impair comity in diplomatic relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union, the basis for immunity did not exist.
108 In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890).

109 Barnes, "Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development
Under International Law and Application in United States Practice," 43 Dep't State Bull.

173 (1960).

110 United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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The trouble with the way the case was handled, however, stemmed
from the fact that the threat of prosecution definitely did threaten to
embarrass relations between the two countries in a very vital respect.
Melekh had been arrested in October 1960. During his detention here,
the Russians were holding in the Soviet Union two American flyers from
an RB-47 plane shot down in or near Soviet territory. They were also
holding in prison Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the ill-fated U-2
plane that had crashed in the Soviet Union the year before."' Early in
1961 the nev administration in Washington was very anxious to obtain
the release of these Americans, and, of course to avoid any new arrests
in Red territory on espionage and similar charges. It was clear that one
way to make such arrests more likely and the desired releases more remote was to hold a Russian here in the face of claims of diplomatic immunity that, while perhaps not strictly warranted, had some color of
justification.
On March 25, 1961, the day set for Melekh's arraignment in a federal
district court in Chicago, the United States attorney appeared before the
judge and requested dismissal of the charges, so that Melekh could
leave the country."2 It was explained that this was being done because
the Departments of State and Justice had concluded that the departure
of Melekh from the United States without trial "would best serve the
national and foreign policy interests of the United States." The judge
"reluctantly" followed the recommendation, "observing that he had little
choice but to approve such a request." There was no mention of diplomatic immunity in this phase of the proceedings, and we must assume
that the State Department would have been loath to give any hint that
persons in Melekh's position could expect to be considered as clothed
in immunity thereafter. But the effect in the particular case was the
same: he was treated as immune, and freed. He had to leave the country,
however, because he had become persona non grata.
Once more the foreign policy branch, acting pursuant to its duty to
tell the courts what were the demands of the comity of nations, had
called for immunity, and, as always, the court responded favorably, if
unhappily. This case seems to make the rule particularly clear, because
the defendant was outside the category of listed diplomats. Still, the
court recognized that, once the demands of policy were made clear by
the proper authorities, its duty to grant the immunity was fixed.
Of course, when a learned court undertakes to consider the issue of
"11 See Lissitzyn, "Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents," 56 Am. J.
Int'l L. 135 (1962).
112 N.Y. Times, March 25, 1961, p. 6.
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immunity in vacuo, without relying on the views of the State Department, a most valuable and interesting essay on the law and practice
may be the result. Such a case is Bergman v. De Sieyes," 3 where the
French minister to Bolivia was served in New York with a summons
in a civil suit brought in that state while he was en route to his post in
South America. His attorneys pleaded diplomatic immunity in a motion
to dismiss addressed to the court. The motion was granted, and this
decision was upheld on appeal. Both Judge Caffey in the district court" 4
and Judge Learned Hand in the court of appeals reviewed the historical
practice and various proposed conventions on the subject and concluded
that, applying international law, "the courts of New York would today
hold that a diplomat in transitu would be entitled to the same immunity
as a diplomat in situ."" 5
The difficulty with this approach is its failure to distinguish between
the decisions of nations to accord certain immunities for policy reasons
and the rule of law involved, whether a rule of New York law, federal
law, or international law. As in all court proceedings involving foreign
governments where action stems from the desire to foster comity and
avoid vexing the peace of nations, the rule of law is activated only when
the political ground has been laid. Once the political arm declares that,
for example, diplomatic immunity is needed for reasons of policy, the
plaintiff encounters the legal principle that he cannot obtain redress in
the municipal courts. In addition to pure political considerations, history,
as reflected in the practice of nations and the writings of scholars, may,
of course, guide the foreign offices in deciding when they should suggest
immunity. Be there present some reason in history or current policy
for the immunity, and the suggestion having been made, then the courts
have no cause to delve further.
SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE

In his concurring opinion in the Pink case, Justice Frankfurter restated an old adage: "In our dealings with the outside world, the United
States speaks with one voice.""16 In several categories of cases, involving
"executive decisions as to foreign policy" this principle leads courts to
declare the matters to be "political, not judicial."' 7 The executive decisions are then allowed to determine the outcome of court proceedings.
.11

170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).

114 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).

115 170 F.2d 360, 363.
116 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942). See also Dickinson, "Jurisdiction
Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law," 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 231, 244
(1934).
117 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
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When the executive branch has spoken, for example, on the question of
recognition of foreign governments or the existence and meaning of
treaties, that is the voice of the United States. If the courts do not follow
its lead, our country will be heard abroad in confused tones. The problem, then, is once more to reconcile obeisance to the judicial function
with the need for harmony when our words are to be heard around the
world.
Recognition
Every judge and every commentator avers that no judge is free to
deny the legitimacy of a regime the executive branch has recognized."1
Congress has supported this opinion by the passage of section 25(b) of
the Federal Reserve Act, giving conclusive effect to the Secretary of
State's certification to banks as to who represents a foreign government," 9 legislation which, as the Restatement points out, was "strictly
speaking... not necessary"'" 0 because the law already required courts
to respect executive pronouncements on recognition. This, by very nearly
unanimous agreement, is a political question. Judge Goodman, a United
States district judge of considerable experience in international legal issues, once rocked the boat of this unanimity by boldly refusing to order
release of bank accounts of the Bank of China. Despite recognition of
the status of the "emigre directors" by the executive branch, the judge
believed that leaving the funds intact was "the only solution which gives
promise of affording protection to the Bank of China, its stockholders
and depositors, and at the same time supporting the foreign policy of
the United States."'' This was in 1950, and he stated that "only time
will tell whether this (communist) government will become a stable
government." Two years later he concluded that time had "clarified"
the picture. "Our national policy toward these governments is now
definite"; we recognize only the Nationalist government, so its repre22
sentatives may have the funds.
If the courts had ordered the banks to turn the Chinese government's
deposits over to representatives of the "unrecognized" communist regime,
what a shambles would have been made of our immutable policy of
supporting Chiang Kai-shek! It was in recognition of the inconsistency
118 E.g., Borchard, "The Unrecognized Government in American Courts," 26 Am. J. Intl
L. 261 (1932). See also National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955).
119 55 Stat. 131 (1941), 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1958).
120 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 114, at 406-07 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
121 Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal.
1950), 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D.Cal. 1952), aff'd, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
122 104 F. Supp. at 59.
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of having unrecognized regimes drawing out funds from banks in the
United States that Congress enacted section 25 (b) of the Federal Reserve
Act, mentioned above. This is legislative sanction for the dominance of
the executive branch in designating the accepted government and determining for banking purposes who is received as its representatives. The
courts would find their paths to decision simplified if they consistently
followed the same principle in other fields.
There is a difference between denying the status of a regime as the
government of a nation whose existence is acknowledged by the United
States, and denying that the nation is in the family of nations. Even
when no regime is accepted, the "state" may exist,123 and may even be

allowed access to our courts. This was done during an interregnum resulting from a Mexican revolution in 1923.124 The court acted on an
approving signal from the State Department. In the same year, on the
other hand, in New York the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic" was once denied access to a court because not "recognized,' 25
and once accorded sovereign immunity because, said the court, it "is the
existing de facto government of Russia.' 12 Also in the same year the
"State of Russia," represented by Ambassador Bakhmetieff, the "recognized" envoy, was allowed to pursue an action for damages resulting from
the Black Tom explosion. 2 7 Perhaps no political harm resulted from
these inconsistencies, but they certainly leave the law in a bewildering
state. More sedulous application of the acknowledged rule that the
status of a nation and a regime is a political question, in which the
courts follow executive pronouncements, should produce a more symmetrical pattern.
Territory
The determination of sovereignty over territory is a function closely
related to the act of recognition of nations and regimes. When the outcome of a court proceeding is of material interest to a foreign government,
and the issue depends on who has sovereignty over territory, the court
must look to the executive branch for an authoritative pronouncement on
the political issue. Suppose, for example, that a treaty between the United
States and France provided for reciprocal inheritance rights for persons
123 Cf. Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102, at 361-62
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
124 Mexico v. Fernandez, [1923] Foreign Relations vol. II, 511.
125 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259
(1923).
126 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 374, 138
N.E. 24, 25 (1923), discussed in text accompanying note 41 supra.
127 Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1927).
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residing in the two countries. A claimant appears in the United States,
basing his claim on residence in Morocco in 1945. The issue before the
local probate court is whether a resident of Morocco is a resident of
France. Who is to decide this?
If the expression "French residents" in the treaty was intended by
the two governments to embrace residents of Morocco, then a failure to
allow the claimant to receive the estate would cause a breach of the treaty
provisions. The French Government would have a justifiable complaint,
and the Department of State, if it agreed with that interpretation, would
have to admit the failure to keep our word. Consequently, if the United
States is to speak with one voice on what constitutes "France" for this
purpose, the court must accept the word of the State Department as
governing. This is precisely what the Court of Claims did in the Etlimar
case, stating that, in view of "the official interpretation by the French
Government and the United States Department of State .. .we must
reject plaintiff's contention . . . and we conclude, therefore, that the
plaintiff was a French resident within the terms of the Agreement."',2
Comparable situations can be envisaged where the decision of a municipal court on the boundaries of the territory of a nation can have an effect
on international relations. The national origin of imported goods can
affect the rate of customs duty. The identity of the government rightfully
exercising sovereignty over an individual's place of birth can resolve the
question of his right to file a claim before a national claims commission.
In all such cases the word of the State Department on the territorial
issue should be sought and its voice should be heeded.
Occasionally a territorial question arises in a domestic court in a
manner that does not affect international relations. In such circumstances the view of the executive department on the political situation
may be given respect, but there is no need to treat it as controlling the
court's decision. Indeed, in such cases the executive should hesitate to
speak at all, but if it does make a statement, it must be very careful to
avoid giving the impression that it would consider the court's opinion
binding in international relations. It was failure to recognize the difference in the cases that made executive intervention in the VermilyaBrown129 case such a fiasco.
The issue there was whether the United States Fair Labor Standards
Act 30 covered employment on a military base on Bermuda leased by
the British to the -United States under an executive agreement signed in
128 Etlimar SA. v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 191 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
129 Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
18o 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1958).
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1941. The act stated that it covered employment of persons engaged in
commerce between the states, including "any territory or possession of
the United States.' 1 3 1 The agreement gave the United States all necessary "rights, power and authority," but nowhere stated that the base
became "territory of the United States." When the British heard that a
lower court had agreed with the theory of the American plaintiffs that
the act covered employment on the base, a note was sent to the State
Department expressing concern lest the United States Government accept the argument that, as between the two governments, the base had
become United States territory. The State Department agreed with the
British view, and told them so. If only it had stopped there, merely
letting the Court see the exchange of notes for guidance, all would have
been well. But the Department went further, and told the Court that
the conclusion of the court below that the act covered the Bermuda base
was "unfortunate," and that any affirmance of the holding that the bases
"are 'possessions' of the United States in a political sense would not in
the Department's view be calculated to improve our relations with that
1 32
Government."'
The State Department could have prevented damage to our relations
with the British by firmly pointing out that no decision in this suit by
American workmen for additional pay from a contractor doing government work could possibly affect the status of the bases as between the
two governments. The issue concerned the interpretation of a statute
of the United States. The Court was merely asked to hold that Congress
had intended the statute to cover employment for United States Government work in such places as the Bermuda bases. Perhaps the British
could object to the payment of such high wages in their territory, but
the remedy for that problem was not to be found in worrying about the
words used to define the scope of the act. The Supreme Court made all
this clear in its opinion, sustaining the plaintiffs' claim that the act
covered their employment. The Court emphasized that "it is a matter of
statutory interpretation," 33 having no effect on the agreed postulate that
"the leased area is under the sovereignty of Great Britain and that it is
not territory of the United States in a political sense." 34 Unlike the
court decisions that were influential in the case of the islands of Minquiers and Ecrehos,'135 no one could possibly say later that this decision
131 52 Stat 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 203(c) (1958).

335 U.S. at 401, n.12.
133 335 U.S. at 389-90. Cf. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacionas de Marineros de Honduras,
83 S. Ct. 671 (1963).
134 335 U.S. at 380-81.
135 Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France and United Kingdom), [1953] IJ.C. Rep. 47.
132
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supported a claim of United States sovereignty. By not recognizing the
real nature of the issue before the Court and explaining it to the British,
the State Department weakened its claim to deference in cases in which
foreign relations' interests are really at stake.
State of War
Most of the cases in domestic courts involving the question whether
a state of war exists have concerned matters unlikely to have any significant effect on international relations. There is often a clause in
insurance policies, for example, excepting claims during a war. Whether
or not this clause applies to a particular instance is not a question on
which the nation must speak with one voice. No other government is
likely to be concerned either way. Consequently there is no cause for a
court to give more than respectful heed to executive pronouncements as
to the existence of a state of war. The same is true if the court is interpreting an act of Congress, such as one depriving a court martial of
jurisdiction over prosecution for certain crimes committed "in time of
peace."' 13 If the defendant has no standing to claim the protection of
another nation, the issue is wholly domestic. The court, of course, may
conclude that the question is really political, and defer to executive views
as to the state of peace or war."37 The deference here, however, has its
justification in judicial absention in political issues generally, not in the
needs of the nation's foreign relations.
Nationality
Sometimes the answer to a question of nationality falls within the
special competence of the Department of State. The amount of deference
due to the views of that Department on such a question should depend,
as in other areas, on whether its words will be heard and have significance
abroad as well as within this country.
In 1943 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide whether
or not Paul Schwartzkopf should be interned as an enemy alien in the
interest of public safety as determined by the Attorney General. Schwartzkopf claimed that he was a citizen of Austria, never an enemy country.
The court perceived the issue as turning on the question whether Germany could force its citizenship on an absent person when it annexed
Austria in 1938, after Schwartzkopf had arrived in the United States. In
the record before the court there was a letter from the Secretary of State
expressing the view that "Mr. Schwartzkopf should be regarded as a
130 See Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
137

See Rex v. Bottrill, ex parte Kuechenmeister, [1946] All E. R. 635 (KB).
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German citizen or subject." 8 The court refused to accept this view.'
It must be borne in mind that the only issue here was whether or not
the United States Government, acting under its own due process of
law-its duly enacted statutes'40 and its constitution-could intern this
man for the duration of the war. Who, in other words, may be so interned?
Since even American citizens are subject to extreme restraint in wartime
the real issue is, what class of persons did Congress intend to embrace in
the words "natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of the hostile nation or
government"? There is no question of "speaking with one voice" on
matters of foreign relations in defining the scope of those words. To
decide whether or not citizens of Austria were "subjects" of Germany in
1938 for purposes of our wartime security legislation could no more be
interpreted by beleaguered Austrians as repudiation or recognition of
Anschluss than could the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to the Bermuda base be interpreted as a claim of sovereignty by the
United States. Consequently the court should deem itself free to give
no more than polite attention to the State Department's opinion as to
nationality and proceed to exercise its judicial function of deciding the
case as a matter of law. This is more like the "state of war" cases, discussed above, than the situation arising in the Etlimar case, discussed
under the heading of "Territory." Disagreement by the court with the
State Department's conclusion here did not subject the Department to
the embarrassment of having to confess to any violation of our word.
The court was speaking only to our own people; its voice would not
be heard abroad and there was no need for harmony with the voice of
the executive.
This same conclusion is applicable to cases of contested nationality of
passport applicants. No matter how much special competence the State
Department may have on the underlying issues of territorial sovereignty
and acts of foreign governments, a person's eligibility for a United States
passport on nationality grounds is a matter of United States law whose
4
interpretation is clearly within judicial jurisdiction and competence.1 1
What has been said heretofore leads to the conclusion that there will
be situations where judgments on issues of nationality rendered by a
body like the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United
States may seriously affect foreign relations. The Commission will then
find it the part of wisdom to obtain views from the State Department in
138 United States ex rel.,Schwartzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898, 900 (2d Cir. 1943).
139 Ibid.

140 40 Stat. 531 (1918), g0 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
International Law in National Courts 15-16, 58 (Third Cornell Summer Conference
on Int'l Law 1960).
141
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order to avoid a clash of United States voices heard abroad. The work
of the Commission involves the adjudication of claims of Americans
against various foreign governments with which lump sum settlement
agreements have been executed. Although there is no appeal from its
decisions,14 it is "a judicial tribunal which performs essentially, if not
solely, judicial functions."'s4 This distinguishes it from ordinary executive agencies, all of which are subject to presidential directive. There
never is any excuse for disharmony in the voices of two such agencies
as the Departments of State and Justice. They may speak only the
words authorized by the President. This principle is especially compelling in the field of foreign affairs, where lack of coordination between
the State Department and other agencies can cause acute embarrassment.
Under an agreement with Yugoslavia,'1 44 the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission deals with a fund paid to the United States for the
payment of claims of Americans against Yugoslavia. After all the claims
authorized by the terms of the agreement have been paid, any funds
left over will be returned to Yugoslavia. This means, for example, that
any payments to persons whose nationality was not American at the
crucial date would violate the agreement and presumably provide the
Yugoslavs with a ground for complaint and demand for a larger return
of surplus funds. 45 Since the State Department would have to deal with
any such protest, it would be well if its views as to the meaning of nationality under the agreement had been sought and given due heed
before the Commission made public its decision. This would no more
involve abdication of the judicial function than is deference by any
court to a political determination by the executive.' 40 It is the only way
to make it likely that the State Department and the Commission, like
any court, would be heard "speaking with one voice" to the affected
foreign governments.
Treaties
The executive may at two stages be involved in problems in courts
arising out of treaties, which includes all types of international agree142 De Vegvar v. Gililland, 228 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 994
(1956); Coerper, "The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and Judicial Review," 50 Am.

J. Int'l L. 868 (1956).
143 Re, "The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and International Claims," 13
Syracuse L. Rev. 516 (1962).
144 62 Stat. 2662 (1948).
145 Cf. Lillich, International Claims, Their Adjudication by National Commissions 38-39
(1962) ; Coerper, supra note 142, at 876.
146 Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 311 U.S.
470 (1941).
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ments: first, whether any treaty is in force, and second, what it means.
If ever it is essential for the nation to speak with one voice, it is in the
cases under the first heading. For a court to deny the force of a treaty,
or any kind of international agreement, while the executive is relying on
it to enforce our own rights is palpably intolerable. This is especially
true when the executives of both governments assume that the treaty
is in force. Given any evidence to support the executive assertion, surely
there is no substantial ground on which a court can stand to hold the
contrary. This is the clear meaning of the words of the Supreme Court
when it overruled the argument on behalf of Porter Charlton that the
extradition treaty with Italy was no longer in force: "The executive department having thus elected to waive any right to free itself from the
obligation to deliver up its own citizens, it is the plain duty of this
,,147
Court to recognize the obligation to surrender the appellant ....
Similar words were used by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
when it rejected the argument of Andrija Artukovic that there was no
extradition treaty with Yugoslavia:
From every practical and logical standpoint every nation must speak to
every other nation through its Chief of State. Here, the President, as the
Chief of State, in recognizing the continuing validity of Treaties between
the United States and Serbia has acted upon a reasonable basis of fact
peculiarly within his sphere of authority . . . and there can be no better

equipped vehicle for decision than the Chiefs of State of the countries
concerned. If their agreed decisions, when based upon supporting
facts,
148
are not conclusive they should at least weigh very heavily.
History seems to show that the weight of combined executive decisions on this issue has always been sufficient to give them conclusive
effect. When a court is confronted with a case in which the views of
the other government are not known, but our executive has asserted the
continuing force of a treaty, the conclusiveness of the assertion may
depend on the extent to which the other government is concerned with
the litigated issue. If there could be no international repercussions from
a decision either way, the question would lose its political coloration.
Such a case is hard to envisage.
Most cases in domestic courts involving treaty rights present questions of fairly direct interest to the other party, either as a government
or as protector of its nationals. May a foreign national inherit property?
May a state prohibit aliens from engaging in particular trades? How
14' Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913). See also Argento v. North, 131 F. Supp. 538
(N.D. Ohio 1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957), 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 617 (1958).
148 Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1954). See Cardozo, "When
Extradition Fails, Is Abduction The Solution"? 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 127 (1961).
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much duty applies to the products of a friendly nation? Will we extradite
an accused criminal? In all these instances the "speak with one voice"
doctrine is peculiarly relevant. For a court to be able to negate national
policy by exercising its own judgment on the existence of an obligation
of the country could do much to vex the peace of nations.
Some State Department officials have emphasized the importance of
this position. 14 9 The State Department's communication to the Court
in Clark v. Allen, 150 however, was so phrased as to cast doubt on the
consistency with which that Department has accepted these views. The
courts were confronted with the question whether the treaty of 1923
with Germany, granting reciprocal inheritance rights, was still in force
in 1942, despite the existence of a state of war. The State Department's
letter to the Attorney General treated the question as purely legal, and
cited Techt v. Hughes'5 ' to support its conclusion that, as a matter of
law, the treaty had survived the outbreak of war. There was, of course,
a large volume of scholarly writing on the question of the survival under
international law of treaties after a war between the parties. 52 In deciding whether to declare a particular treaty still in force, the Department
of State naturally must consider this history, since the matter ultimately
is likely to become a matter of negotiation with the other party. The
Secretary of State would then have to support his position with legal
arguments. When he has concluded, however, that it is open to him to
contend, under the law, that the treaty remains in force, he has a further
function, i.e., to make the political determination whether this government desires the continuation of the treaty obligations. Throughout the
opinion in Techt v. Hughes this political function is recognized:
This, I think, is the principle which must guide the judicial department
of the government when called upon to determine during the progress of
a war whether a treaty shall be observed in the absence of some declaration by the political departments of the government that it has been suspended or annulled. But until some one of these things is done, until some
of these events occur, while war is still flagrant, and the will of the political
departments of the government unrevealed, the courts, as I view their
function, play a humbler and more cautious part.153 (Emphasis added.)
When the Vermilya-Brown case came up in 1948, the State Department
was in a position to reveal "the will of the political departments" regard149 Cf. Comment by Raymund T. Yingling, International Law in National Courts 55
(Third Cornell Summer Conference on Int'l Law 1960).
150 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 85-92, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
151 Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920).
152 See citations in Bishop, International Law: Cases and Materials 179 (2d ed. 1962).
See also Layton, "The Effect of Measures Short of War on Treaties," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev.
96, 99 (1962).
153 229 N.Y. at 242, 243.
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ing the 1923 treaty with Germany. They wanted the treaty to continue,
and their wish was justified by legal precedents. 54 The letter, therefore,
after citing the legal basis of the determination, should have contained a
clear declaration that it was the policy of the government to deal with
the treaty as a continuing obligation. The Department's determination,
upon a reasonable basis in fact and law, would then be the revealed "will
of the political departments of the government," whose voice in matters
of foreign relations is the one voice of the United States. Whether or
not a treaty is in force is surely in the area of foreign relations.
When we turn to problems of treaty interpretation we touch delicate
nerves. To proclaim the meaning of the written word is so hallowed a
judicial function that we have fashioned a parol evidence rule to prevent
even the views of the writers themselves from intruding into the sanctuary. Will the international lawyers be able to sustain an argument that
once the executive branch has spoken on the meaning of a written treaty,
the courts must adjudge accordingly? They must at least try.
As a matter of fact, the courts have helped to establish such a rule,
but they have stopped just short of making the executive determination
conclusive. They say over and over that it is entitled to "great weight."
In the Kolovrat case in 1961 the Supreme Court said it again: "While
courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the
departments of the government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."' 5 The Restatement also
states that "the judicial branch . . . has exclusive authority to interpret

an international agreement" but gives "great weight" to executive
views.156 How close this comes to making the executive determination
"conclusive" may be illustrated by a discussion of the weight to be given
to executive interpretation at the Cornell Summer Conference on International Law in 1960:
Mr. Metzger: ... With the leeway that the language gave, shouldn't that
be a situation where a court should give considerable weight-not conclusive-to this carefully argued exchange of notes... ?
This points up the difference between what you are doing when you are
interpreting a treaty; you have something more than when you are interpreting a statute. In my judgment, unless this is borne in mind, there will
be too wooden an application of a statutory technique to this field where
new elements are added.
154 See Rank, '"Modern War and the Validity of Treaties: A Comparative Study," 38
Cornell L.Q. 321, 511 (1953).

155 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Robertson v. United States, 294 F.2d
920 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
156 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 153, at 553; § 155, at
558-59 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Mr. Cardozo: I wish Stan had defined "considerable" a little bit more ....
157
Mr. Re: And he said it loudly.
When all the parties to a treaty agree on an interpretation, it should
not be necessary for them to declare their view loudly in order to bind
a domestic court. 5 8 How can an agreement mean anything other than
what the parties say it means? This applies even in domestic contract
law, where the interpretation agreed upon by the parties even binds
third party beneficiaries. 59 Private parties whose interests are affected
by treaties can hardly complain, therefore, if they must abide by the
interpretation adopted by the governments concerned. The courts, therefore, can be expected to accede.
The "great weight" apothegm was used by the Federal Communications Commission in 1953 in an adjudication on the cable rates to be
charged to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the International Monetary Fund for messages sent abroad from
the United States.1 60 The question was whether the Bank and the Fund
were entitled to the same reduced rates as foreign governments received
in this country. The State Department had advised the Commission that,
under the Bretton Woods Agreements, the "United States Government
is committed to support" the interpretation adopted unanimously by
the executive directors of the two organizations, who in turn had formulated their decision pursuant to the weighted voting procedure established
in the two agreements. 161 Under these procedures, "interpretation" in
some situations will look more like revision. 62 Nonetheless, the FCC
opinion accepted the obligation to give "great weight" to the Department
of State's communication, and declared it to be "an additional basis" for
its conclusion that the agreements themselves called for the reduced rates.
This was a case where the views of the executive should be expressed
loud and clear, and given more weight than any private litigant could
withstand. Failure to follow the executive views could have put the nation in default on an obligation to many other nations. Is not the interpretation then properly categorized with political matters that fall outside the judicial function?
The "great weight" test in treaty interpretation has been hallowed
157 International Law in National Courts 53 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on Int'l
Law 1960).
158 See Dickinson, supra note 116.
159 3 Corbin, Contracts § 558 (1960).
160 International Bank v. All America Cables, FCC Docket No. 9362, decided March 23,
1953, 8 Pike & Fischer, Radio Regulation 927 (1953).
161 See Metzger, "Settlement of International Disputes by Non-Judicial Methods," 48
Am. J. Int'l L. 408 (1954).
162 Cf. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations 74 (1933).
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by such long usage that it would surely be futile to try to change it. The
Supreme Court recently has unequivocally reconfirmed it.1 3 The words,
however, are not crucial. As long as the courts do not lightly allow litigants to get out from under the weight of an executive interpretation,
the government will not have to worry that a decision of a judge will
cause international embarrassment. State Department suggestions respecting the meaning of treaties can be expected to continue to enjoy
the uniform observance that has characterized their reception in the
sovereign immunity field.
CONCLUSION

The State Department, whenever international comity or national
policy is involved in a case before the courts, must recognize its duty to
give the courts clear statements of the views of the political departments,
even--or, rather, especially--"on matters pending before the courts." 64
Unfortunately, past official reticence justified the remark in the draft
Restatement that "The attorney may have difficulty in getting evidence
of an executive interpretation material to his case."' 6 5 This is abdication,
not wise discretion. Further, no longer should it be "unlikely that the
court will request it officially for him."' 66 A court trying to decide an
international law case without advice on the political ramifications is as
much in the dark as a judge sitting on a libel case without the innuendo
required to explain the defamatory connotation of an equivocal published writing. An element essential to decision is missing. When the
executive supplies that element, the judges cannot justly accuse it of
going "outside the scope of its proper functions" and usurping the
judicial prerogative. The executive pronouncement will reveal the political facts of foreign relations on which the legal conclusions have to be
based in the courts of the nation. 16 7 Those courts are also part of the
government. The voices of the judges, when they pass over the water's
edge, must harmonize with the executive's. The exercise of judicial
deference is then recognition of the executive's prerogative, not abdication of the judiciary's responsibility.
163

Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).

164 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307

F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted 31 U.S.L. Week 3255 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963).
165 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 154, at 558 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). Cf. Zander, "The Act of State Doctrine," 53 Am. I. Int'l L. 826, 851
(1959).
166 Restatement, supra note 165.
167 Cf. McDougal, "International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception," 1953-I, Recueil des Cours, Academie de Droit International, 132-259, esp. 157.

